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INTRODUCTION
The subject of modern piracy has now become well-known and
involves an age-old crime—kidnap for ransom. According to an
annual piracy report issued by the Piracy Reporting Centre of the
International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime
Bureau, a total of 406 incidents of piracy and armed robbery were
reported in 2009, with 153 vessels boarded, 49 vessels hijacked, 84
1
attempted attacks, and 120 vessels fired upon. Shipowners have used
industry Best Management Practices—e.g., training of crew,
2
implementation of the Ship Security Reporting System, use of
military escort and crisis management services—to thwart pirate
3
attacks. Nevertheless, in the event of a successful hijacking, payment
of ransom is nearly always the only way to save the lives of crew and
4
free the ship.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Maersk Alabama
Perhaps the only exception to this rule is the outcome of the pirate
hijacking of the 1098-TEU U.S. flagged Maersk Alabama on April 8,
5
2009. The crew initially fought off the attack, but the pirates fled
with the captain as a hostage. U.S. naval forces then killed three of
the pirate kidnappers, arrested one, and saved the captain, all
6
without American casualty.
Despite the success of the Maersk
1. ICC Commercial Crime Services, 2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400,
Jan. 14, 2010,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=385:2009worldwide-piracy-figures-surpass-400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51
[hereinafter Piracy Figures].
2. See Tackling the Costs of Piracy, 368 FAIRPLAY 18, 18 (2010).
3. For a further explanation on Best Management Practices see Practical
Measures to Combat Pirates, 367 FAIRPLAY 14, 14 (2009). Self-help deterrents available
to seafarers include using barbed wire, empty forty-five gallon drums, wood, and/or
netting to cut off access to primary areas or to the vessel’s deck. Id.
4. Cf. Samantha Kenny, Comment, Regional Shortcomings and Global Solutions:
Kidnap, Ransom and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 557, 577–81 (2008)
(arguing that payment of ransom greatly increases the likelihood of a safe return for
kidnap victims in South America).
5. See 2009 Review Month by Month, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 18, 2009, at 37, available at
http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w2009-12-18/article550163.ece?serviceprintArticle; see also Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage Of
Pirates, Navy Ship Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/africa/09pirates.html
(detailing further accounts of the Maersk Alabama’s encounter with pirates).
6. In fact, Captain Richard Phillips’ life rights have been acquired by Columbia
Pictures Studio, which has also optioned the film rights to Phillips’ upcoming
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Alabama rescue campaign, repeats of such a highly coordinated and
risky maneuver will not be common.
The jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy in the case of Maersk Alabama was
clear. The vessel was registered with the United States flag and
7
employed a crew of American citizens. Given the international
nature of the shipping industry, however, there are numerous other
situations in which the jurisdiction of the United States to act could
be muddled. For example, a hijacked vessel may well be flagged, as
many are, in one of the several nations that maintain ship registries,
such as the Republic of the Marshall Islands or the Republic of
8
Liberia. Or the vessel may be owned by a single-purpose corporation
incorporated under the laws of Norway and organized as a subsidiary
of a United States parent corporation organized under the laws of
Delaware.
The Authors of this Article faced a similar set of circumstances in
November, 2008, with the hijacking of the Liberian-flagged Biscaglia.
We assisted Industrial Shipping Enterprises Corp., a corporation
organized and existing in the Republic of the Marshall Islands but
based in Connecticut, in the company’s negotiations with pirates over
the payment of ransom and the safe release of the company’s
international crew and vessel. These negotiations, to our surprise,
were conducted in a somewhat business-like manner with the Somali
pirates, and happily resulted in the safe release of the crew, the ship,
and its cargo.
In addition, since the Maersk Alabama hijacking, it has been
suggested that aggressive responses to pirate attacks and hijackings
9
will lead to an escalating risk of reprisal from the pirates. In fact,
there appears to be a trend of increasing risk of violence associated
10
with hijacking and ransoming of a vessel’s crew. In terms of the
gross numbers during 2009, sixty-eight crew members were injured
memoir. Tatiana Siegel, Columbia Hooks Pirate Tale, VARIETY, May 28, 2009,
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118004256.html.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts over vessels
belonging to the United States or its citizens, as well as any vessel registered under
the laws of the United States).
8. See generally John T. Oliver, Legal and Policy Factors Governing the Imposition of
Conditions on Access to and Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Flag Vessels in U.S. Ports, 5 S.C. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 210 (2009); Constantine G. Papavizas, U.S.-Flag Vessel Financing and
Citizenship Requirements Update, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 35 (2007) (detailing international
ship registries and U.S. jurisdiction concerns).
9. See, e.g., Corey Flintoff, Somali Pirates Threaten Revenge, NPR, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103035759&ft=1&f=1001
(discussing how Somali pirates will specifically target American ships and officials).
10. See Piracy Figures, supra note 1; see also John Drake, Violent Attacks on the Rise Off
Africa, LLOYD’S LIST, Dec. 4, 2009, at 13 (describing the Somali pirates’ escalating use
of violence and increasing aggression).
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and eight were reported killed by pirates—much higher than
11
previous years. In fact, after the Maersk Alabama hijacking, Somali
pirates threatened to target U.S. vessels and crew in specific
12
retaliation.
B. Response
While the Maersk Alabama incident brought the modern face of
piracy into the media spotlight, not all the effects of this publicity
have been positive. Up until the Maersk Alabama incident, virtually all
hijackings in the Gulf of Aden had played out in a similar manner—
primitive business negotiations with the pirates eventually leading to
13
a safe release. Other than coverage in the trade press, Somali piracy
was not front page news. The detentions followed a similar pattern:
a hijacking occurred, the parties negotiated for release of the
hostages for a forty-five to sixty-day time period, and an agreement
was eventually reached on the amount of the ransom and the drop14
off mechanics. In most cases, there were few reports of violence
15
following the initial attack.
Although governments became involved as the piracy problem
increased, by protecting ships transiting the Gulf of Aden, there were
few calls for action to resolve the problem. That changed with the
Maersk Alabama incident. Before long, mass media and political
16
players, perhaps thoughtlessly, were equating piracy with terrorism.
11. Piracy Figures, supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Flintoff, supra note 9 (noting that some pirates consider America and
American ships their “No. 1 enemy”).
13. The Article will sometimes make reference to incidents of piracy off the coast
of Somalia as examples in order to provide a pertinent real-world application of the
analysis used herein. See supra text accompanying note 1 (listing 406 incidents of
piracy that occurred in 2009, 217 of which were attributed to Somali pirates). Such
analysis can be applied to pirate hijackings in other areas of the world.
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Said to Be Near Arms Cargo Deal, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
9,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/world/africa/09pirates.html;
Sharon
Otterman, Pirates Said to Ask for $25 Million Ransom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/world/africa/21pirates.html.
15. This matter of course does not always hold true. After hijackers of the Greekowned vessel Maran Centaurus received what is to be believed as the largest ransom
ever delivered, in the amount of approximately $6,000,000, a fight between pirate
factions over the funds reportedly led to the deaths of two pirates. Nigel Lowry,
Hijackers Hit Jackpot with Record $6m Ransom Win, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 19, 2010, at 1; see
also Abdi Guled & Abdi Sheikh, Somali Pirates Free Oil Tanker for Record Ransom,
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60H3WB20100118
(reporting that four pirates died in the incident and that the amount was between
$5.5 million and $7 million).
16. See, e.g., Joshua London, Commentary, Somalia’s Muslim Jihad at Sea, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A19 (criticizing the government’s refusal to treat pirates as
terrorists); Cal Thomas, Terror on the Seas, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 2009, at A21
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This concept had particular significance for companies, like the
owner of the Biscaglia, that have a presence in the United States. The
pirates are kidnappers, and as the legal analysis in this Article
indicates, for now at least, ransom payments by U.S. entities to pirates
not blocked on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) list
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN
List”) are unlikely to result in any kind of sanction—civil or
criminal—to the payer of the ransom. As discussed below, this
analysis will change if the government eventually deems pirates to be
terrorists or promulgates further regulations to that effect pursuant
to Executive Order 13536 issued by President Barack Obama dated
April 12, 2010 (the “Executive Order”), issued just before the
17
publication of this Article.
The development of a secured transit corridor through the Gulf of
Aden reduced pirate activity there, but pirates have responded by
18
expanding the range of their attacks. At the end of November,
2009, the Joint War Committee of Lloyd’s extended the war-risk zone
19
in the region. International forces now need to cover not only the
Gulf of Aden, but also the Somali Basin, with attacks taking place as
far as one thousand miles off the Somali coast in an area covering 1.5
20
million square miles of ocean. As one commentator has described:
“[A] transit system, as in operation in the Gulf of Aden, cannot be
applied to the Indian Ocean. Some 35,000 ships cross the Somali
Basin annually operating on a complex set of trade routes, as
21
compared with the two-way system through the Gulf of Aden.”
Accordingly, with no overall strategic resolution, military or
otherwise, to the increasingly serious problem of piracy, the only
practical way that shipowners can save the lives of their crew members
is to pay a ransom. And, if payment of ransoms is made illegal while
(comparing pirates to Islamic terrorists and arguing that they should be dealt with in
the context of the larger operation against terrorists).
17. Exec. Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 15, 2010) [hereinafter
Executive Order].
18. See Adam Corbett, Navies ‘Overstretched’ in Piracy Fight, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 18,
2009,
at
54,
available
at
http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w2009-1218/articles550192.ece?service=printArticle (noting that as sites of pirate attacks
widen, the naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and around Africa has thinned to the
point where it may take up to two days for a vessel to reach the site of an attack).
19. See Adam Corbett, Pirates Target Tanker Corridor, TRADE WINDS, Dec. 4, 2009, at
46, available at
http://www.tradewinds.no/weekly/w20091204/article549327.ece?service=printArticl
(providing the latitude and longitude of the extended boundaries).
20. See Navies ‘Overstretched’ in Piracy Fight, supra note 18 at 54 (discussing the
difficulty of reaching attacked vessels due to the ever-widening area of such
occurrences).
21. Id.
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the overall problem of piracy is still unsolved, shipowners will be
placed in an untenable position.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A December, 2008, report by the United Nations Monitoring
Group on Somalia, which oversees an arms embargo on militias in
that country, described how a typical ransom payment is distributed
once it is paid: thirty percent is split equally among the maritime
militia that seizes the vessel (exceptions being that the first pirate to
board is given a double take of proceeds and a fine is imposed on
pirates that fight other pirates), ten percent goes to the ground
militia guarding the vessel while it is anchored offshore, ten percent
is distributed to the local community, and the remaining fifty percent
goes to Somali investors, who are said to sponsor and finance the
22
attacks.
In most instances, federal law cannot be construed to prohibit an
entity, be it a vessel owner or its insurers, from making a ransom
payment to pirates to secure the release of a hijacked vessel and its
crew. This Article explores whether there could be any violation of
U.S. federal law in the event that a vessel owner and its insurers pay a
ransom to pirates such as those that operate off the coast of Somalia.
At least three important sources of federal law and regulation must
23
be considered: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),
24
executive orders, and the regulations promulgated by OFAC.
Additionally, examination of the legality of ransom payments to
pirates raises the question of whether such payments implicate
violations of other federal laws that prohibit either the funding of
terrorist groups or money laundering. The following Sections
explore how the various laws affecting the payments of ransom would
apply to both domestic and foreign companies.
A critical consideration is that ransom payments must not go to any
25
person, organization, or foreign government on OFAC’s SDN List.
The SDN List is a lengthy and growing document that includes a
number of Somali citizens and other individuals residing in Somalia
22. U.N. Sec. Council, Sec. Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution
751 (1992) Concerning Somalia, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008), ¶ 140, U.N. Doc. S/2008/769 (Dec. 10, 2008),
available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1 to –3 (2006).
24. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101–500.314 (2009).
25. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last visited May
24, 2010) [hereinafter “SDN List”] (as of the date last visited, containing 454 pages).
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(including those on the Annex to the Executive Order). The list is
primarily intended to be used by banks and regulatory agencies, and
is predominately so used, but it also serves as the default list of those
26
persons to whom payments are restricted in any capacity.
A. Distinction Between Piracy and Maritime Terrorism
Both piracy and maritime terrorism exist separately, and it is
dangerous to equate the two. They are two separate and distinct
manifestations of non-state violence at sea. Commentators have
distinguished the two occurrences as follows: Piracy is predicated
upon pecuniary gain while terrorism is motivated by political goals
beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target; the former
will eschew attention and aim to sustain their trade while the latter
27
will court publicity and inflict as much damage as possible.
Kevin Jon Heller, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Auckland
Faculty of Law in New Zealand, whose areas of expertise include
international criminal law, notes that while pirates may be enemies of
all states, that does not make them the same as terrorists:
The defining feature of terrorism is precisely that it is committed
not for private ends, but to intimidate a civilian population or to
influence government policy. Indeed, over the long and troubled
history of efforts to create a general definition of terrorism, that is
perhaps the only aspect of the definition that has never seriously
28
been in doubt.

Another commentator has described terrorism as “the threat or use
of physical coercion, primarily against noncombatants, especially
civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political
29
objectives.” In contrast, pirates are involved in the venture purely
for financial gain and generally have no discernable politics, and they
can therefore be distinguished from terrorists.
While speculation and conjecture about an emerging nexus
between piracy and terrorism complicates the legality of ransom
payments, as witnessed with the Executive Order, which treats them
26. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Ruff, Comment, Scared to Donate: An Examination of the
Effects of Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the First Amendment
Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 458 (2005) (discussing the
statutory framework and operation of the SDN List).
27. Adam Young & Mark Valencia, Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast
Asia: Rectitude and Utility, 25 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 269, 270–74 (2003).
28. Posting of Kevin Jon Heller to Opinio Juris, Why Piracy is Not Terrorism,
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/12/05/why-piracy-is-not-terrorism/ (Dec. 5, 2008,
15:53 EDT) (emphasis in original).
29. BARD E. O’NEILL, INSURGENCY & TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE
33 (2d ed. 2005).
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together in the context of Somalia, credible evidence to support this
30
presumed convergence has yet to emerge. It is important to discern
that the objectives of the two remain entirely distinct. The business
of piracy is dependent on a thriving and active global shipping
industry. In contrast, terrorists, in the context of the contemporary
maritime world, would seek the disruption of the global maritime
31
trade network to further their political ends. As will be seen from
the analysis in the following Section, this distinction between piracy
and terrorism is paramount to the conclusion that the payment of
ransom to pirates not specifically identified on the SDN List does not
violate U.S. federal law.
B. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The fundamental provision of the FCPA that defines outlawed
conduct is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. The FCPA expressly
32
prohibits any “domestic concern,” or its officers, directors,
employees, or agents, from making payments intended to undermine
the rule of law in a foreign country. This gives rise to the question:
Would the payment of ransom to pirates undermine the rule of law,
in Somalia for example, and thus run afoul of the FCPA?
Specifically, the FCPA prohibits:
[M]ak[ing] use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of

30. See PETER CHALK, THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY xiv
(RAND
Corp.
2008),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf (“The presumed
convergence between maritime terrorism and piracy remains highly questionable . . .
.”).
31. See id. at 22 (discussing the fears of government officials that maritime
terrorism would shut down an important port or otherwise disrupt the delicate
supply chain). Al-Qaida has developed a strategy for maritime terrorism under the
direction of Abdel Rahim al-Nashiri. Id. at 20 n.4. The strategy involved ramming
ships with explosives, detonating medium sized vessels in the vicinity of larger ones,
crashing planes into ships, and commissioning underwater demolition teams. Id.
After he was arrested in 2003, he confessed to masterminding the attacks on the USS
Cole and M/V Limburg. Id.
32. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, the term “domestic concern”
means:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States;
and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which
has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2006).
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anything of value to—(1) any foreign official . . . (2) any foreign
political party . . . or (3) any person, while knowing that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any
foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
33
foreign political office [for enumerated prohibited purposes].

It is important to note that the question of whether the FCPA
applies would be stopped short if it could not be proven that the
34
ransom was paid to a political entity. The list of prohibited purposes
includes:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to
do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii)
securing any improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign
official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such
domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
35
directing business to, any person.

It is clear from the text of the FCPA that Congress intended to
prevent U.S. entities and public companies trading on the U.S.
markets from engaging in acts intended to influence the acts or
decisions of foreign officials, political parties, or government
36
entities.
Nowhere does the statute refer to payments to private
persons, except in the context of foreign government officials and
foreign political parties, including officials thereof. Payment to those
individuals is prohibited in that context only if such individuals are
expected to “affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer in
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
37
any person.”
Given that Somali pirate gangs have generally
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
34. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International
Business, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 757 n.36 (1996) (clarifying that the FCPA
only applies to political entities and does not prohibit the bribing of foreign private
individuals to gain non-political business advantages).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
36. Provisions of the FCPA apply to “any issuer which has a class of securities
registered pursuant to [15 U.S.C. § 78l] or which is required to file reports under [15
U.S.C. § 78o(d)], or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or
any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The
term “issuer” means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security subject to
certain exclusions. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8). Similar to the jurisdiction of federal
securities laws, the relevant provisions of the FCPA should apply to foreign
companies publicly trading in the U.S. markets.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B).
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consisted solely of freelancers or tribal groups and clans operating
wholly outside the laws of Somalia or any other nation, ransom
payments do not appear to be intended to influence or undermine
any government’s actions or policies. Therefore, the FCPA would not
apply to ransom payments to pirates. The fact is that the rule of law
in Somalia, to the extent there is any, is not impacted by ransom
payments.
C. Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations
OFAC administers a series of regulations (the “OFAC
Regulations”) that impose economic sanctions against hostile targets
38
to further U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
OFAC is also responsible for promulgating, developing, and
administering for the U.S. Department of the Treasury economic
39
sanctions under several federal statutes regarding embargoes.
A
close reading of the OFAC Regulations makes it evident that the
sanctions target certain foreign governments, political parties,
terrorist groups, and enumerated individuals. All U.S. banking
regulatory agencies cooperate in ensuring financial institutional
compliance with the OFAC Regulations. This is widely seen as the
basis from which the United States would be able to regulate the
40
payment of ransom to pirates.
Due to an explosion of maritime attachment litigation in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
41
2008, it became common knowledge in the shipping industry that
wire transfers made in U.S. dollars will pass through a clearing house
system made up of a number of intermediary money center banks,
42
most of which are located in New York City.
If a wire transfer

38. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101–500.314 (2009).
39. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
40. See, e.g., Jonathan Spencer, Hull Insurance and General Average—Some Current
Issues, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1266–67 (2009) (recognizing the OFAC regulations and
SDN list as the “critical step” in ensuring the legality of ransom payments).
41. Previously, electronic funds transfers were subject to attachment in New York
under Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI. 310 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002). On October
16, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly
overruled Winter Storm, ruling that electronic funds transfers that are in transit
located with an intermediary bank are not property of the defendant that is subject
to attachment pursuant to Rule B. See Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Jaldhi
Overseas Pte, Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67–71 (2d Cir. 2009) cert. denied 78 U.S.L.W. 3447
(U.S. Mar. 22, 2010). Since then, the number of maritime attachment cases has
fallen off and many existing attachments have been vacated.
42. See, e.g., Ian F. Taylor, Comment, Maritime Madness: Rule B, Electronic Funds
Transfers, Maritime Contracts, and the Explosion of Admiralty Litigation in the Southern
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payment is to be sent directly or indirectly to the legal or beneficial
ownership of a recipient on the SDN List, then the payment would be
blocked in transit while passing through the clearing house system.
Banks utilize government-mandated OFAC filters to seize these funds
and they used the same filters in maritime attachment cases before
electronic funds transfers (“EFTs”) were judged not to be attachable
43
property for such purposes.
As of the date this Article went to print, there are no specific OFAC
Regulations that address the issue of ransom payments to kidnappers
44
or pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. Similarly, Somalia
currently is not one of the nations whose government is targeted by
U.S. sanctions or the OFAC Regulations, with only certain specified
45
individuals being blocked.
At the time of this Article’s writing, there is legitimate concern
that, through a U.S. Department of State initiative, OFAC will use
46
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1844 —one of several resolutions
dealing with Somalia—and the Executive Order discussed below to
enforce financial sanctions against the payment of ransom in
Somalia, or that it will otherwise amend legislation to make the
47
payment of ransom illegal.
Resolution 1844 reaffirms previous
resolutions with respect to Somalia by condemning all acts of
violence within the country and incitement of violence therein, and
by expressing concern about all acts intended to prevent or block a
48
peaceful political process.
Although it expresses concern over
piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, it grants great
deference to the Committee formed by U.N. Resolution 751 in the
determination of individuals and entities to which the sanctions shall
District of New York, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 211, 217 (2009) (detailing the operation of the
EFT clearing house system in New York).
43. The court in Jaldhi Overseas ruled, with the consent of all the judges in the
Southern District of New York, to overturn the court’s prior holding in Winter Storm,
which created the precedent that EFTs are attachable property. Jaldhi Overseas, 585
F.3d 58, 67–71; Winter Storm, 310 F.3d 263.
44. The Authors of this Article rely on information provided in the CFR and on
OFAC’s website as of the date this Article was sent to publication.
45. Countries currently targeted include the Balkans, Belarus, Burma, the Ivory
Coast, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Lebanon, North
Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. OFAC Sanctions Program Summaries,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/ (last visited Apr. 27,
2010).
46. S.C. Res. 1844, ¶¶ 3, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008).
47. See Keith Wallis, Hong Kong Owners Sound Alarm Over Talk of US Ban on
Ransoms, LLOYD’S LIST, Feb. 22, 2010, at 4 (anticipating that a proposal to make
payment of ransoms illegal will be met with a strong backlash); see also Adam Corbett,
Worries Over US Plan on Ransoms, TRADEWINDS, Feb. 19, 2010 (discussing the negative
implications pf banning the payment of ransom in Somalia).
48. S.C. Res. 1844, supra note 46, at ¶ 6.
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50

apply. The U.N. Security Council recently issued Resolution 9913
which calls on all states to criminalize piracy under national laws. As
the United States already criminalizes piracy under various federal
51
antipiracy statutes, Resolution 9913 is unlikely to have much effect
on U.S. law, but it nonetheless serves as further evidence of the
growing attention to piracy in the region.
D. Executive Order Issued by the White House
52

Effective as of April 13, 2010, the Executive Order specifically
prohibits “the making of any contribution or provision of funds,
goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this
53
order.” To the extent that a pirate has been identified as a blocked
person, this provision prohibits the payment of ransom to that
person. However, there should be no retroactive liability if a
shipowner is currently dealing with an individual or entity that later
becomes identified.
The Annex attached to the Executive Order identifies eleven
individuals and the terrorist organization al-Shabaab as “blocked
persons,” two of the individuals being self-identified pirates. To the
extent that a payment of ransom is being made to a blocked person,
the payment of that ransom is prohibited by the Executive Order.
The current list of blocked persons may be expanded at any time by
the President or by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in
consultation with the U.S. Department of State. The Executive Order
54
specifically authorizes further regulations to be promulgated, and in
other U.S. sanction programs, the Treasury Department has regularly
promulgated rules to supplement the SDN List.
On May 5, 2010, the Treasury Department promulgated Somalia
55
Sanctions Regulations and stated in the summary that it further
intends to supplement the regulations in order to, inter alia, provide
further interpretive guidance, additional licenses, and statements of
licensing policy. The Somalia Sanctions Regulations extend the list

49. Id. at ¶ 8.
50. S.C. Res. 9913, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/9913 (Apr. 27, 2010).
51. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651–61 (establishing sentencing guidelines for various
acts of piracy).
52. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 9.
53. Id. § 1(d)(i).
54. Id. § 5.
55. Somalia Sanctions Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,394 (May 5, 2010) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 551).

RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

MUGGED TWICE?

6/22/2010 8:06 PM

1437

of blocked persons to entities owned by the blocked persons listed on
56
the Annex of the Executive Order.
Several portions of the Somalia Sanctions Regulations are reserved,
and, consistent with the language in the Executive Order, additional
supplements of the Somalia Sanctions Regulations may specifically
address the issue of ransom—a topic that the Executive Order and
current Somalia Sanctions Regulations do not expressly address. For
example, the Executive Order blocks the property of all persons
listed in the Annex as well as any person determined “to have
engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security,
57
or stability of Somalia.”
Included on this list are leaders of the
Islamic group al-Shabaab and two, or perhaps three, persons
considered to have engaged in acts of piracy or attempted acts of
58
piracy. To what extent the Somalia Sanctions Regulations extend
this mandate remains to be seen.
Despite speculation that there would be many names listed, to date
there are reports on the SDN List of only two affiliates of Somali
59
pirates who received ransom payments.
A U.S. “person” that
contemplates the payment of ransom to pirates will need to ensure
that, if he or she obtains any information as to the identity or
identities of the group who will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the
ransom payment, none of those recipients are listed on the SDN List.
Since ransom payments to pirates are generally delivered in cash
directly to pirates, it is highly unlikely that any wire transfer from a
shipowner or its insurer will be caught by a bank as payment to a
blocked person. The Authors of this Article doubt that the pirates
will be accepting payments by wire transfer any time soon.
In accordance with guidance provided by OFAC, all “U.S. persons”
must comply with OFAC regulations, including: all U.S. citizens and
permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all
persons and entities within the United States, and all U.S.
60
corporations and their foreign branches. This is the same definition
61
that is used in the Executive Order. For certain programs, such as
those regarding Cuba and North Korea, all foreign subsidiaries

56. Id. at 24,398 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 551.406).
57. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 1(a)(ii)(A).
58. Executive Order, supra note 17, Annex.
59. SDN List, supra note 25; Executive Order, supra note 17, Annex. Two persons
on the Annex are considered to be known affiliates of Somali pirates.
60. OFAC, U.S. Department of the Treasury Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#10
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
61. Executive Order, supra note 17, § 3(c).
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62

owned or controlled by U.S. companies also must comply. Certain
programs further require foreign persons in possession of U.S. origin
63
goods to comply. Unlike the FCPA, the OFAC Regulations do not
normally apply to a foreign company where the activities in question
have no relation to the United States; however, the level of contacts
with the United States must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
E. Federal Statutes Prohibiting the Financing of Terrorism
The relevant restrictions on financing terrorism are contained in
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
64
(“AEDPA”).
One provision in the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,
specifically prohibits those subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States from conducting activities that would result in providing
material support or resources to a formally designated foreign
65
“terrorist organization.” The list of groups is designated by the U.S.
66
Secretary of State and is sometimes referred to as the “FTO List.” A
payor should ensure that a recipient of a ransom payment is not on
the FTO List. To violate § 2339B, “a person must have knowledge that
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . or that
67
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”
The other pertinent AEDPA provision is 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, as it
specifically deals with the prohibitions against financing terrorism. It
explicitly prohibits a party from
provid[ing] or collect[ing] funds with the intention that such
funds be used, or with the knowledge such funds [will] be used . . . to
carry out—(A) an act which constitutes an offense within the scope
of a treaty specified in subsection (e)(7), as implemented by the
62. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.329 (2009).
63. See United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
and
Answers,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml (last visited
May 24, 2010) (detailing who must comply with OFAC regulations).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–
2339D (2006)).
65. For purposes of AEDPA, the term “terrorist organization” means “an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1189].“ 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6).
66. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (describing in detail the State
Department’s designation process for Foreign Terrorist Organizations and providing
the current list of such organizations which includes forty-five formally designated
foreign terrorist organizations).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (emphasis added). As used in this context, the term
“terrorist activity” is defined within § 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, while the term “terrorism” is defined within § 140(d)(2) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. Id.
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United States, or (B) any other act intended to cause death or
serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking
an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict,
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
68
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

It is apparent from the statute’s legislative history that Congress
viewed this provision as one intended to prevent financing of terrorist
69
organizations.
70
In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York interpreted §
2339C in a case that involved an English bank that was sued by Israeli
71
victims of a terrorist act conducted by Hamas. The plaintiffs argued
that the bank was liable under the statute’s civil liability provisions
because it knew that one of its customers, an Islamic charity with
known ties to Hamas, was a conduit for funneling funds to the
72
terrorist organization. The district court held that the bank was
potentially liable under § 2339C because it could reasonably be
inferred that the bank was sufficiently aware of its customer’s links to
Hamas to know that the funding would be used to support terrorist
73
activities. The district court clearly based its decision on the fact
that Hamas is a known and designated terrorist organization and that
the Islamic charity’s ties to Hamas should have been known by the
74
bank based on “know your customer” requirements.
The broad language in § 2339C raises concerns that the statute
could be interpreted as prohibiting the payment of ransoms to
pirates engaged in activities that violate the scope of the various
treaties, particularly the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

68. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-307, at 6–7 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
521, 521–22 (denoting the federal government’s willingness to bind itself to
prosecute or extradite those who fund terrorism).
70. 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
71. Id. at 612. Hamas is a formally designated terrorist organization on the FTO
List. Id. at 616.
72. See id. at 612 (explaining that victims of the attacks sought civil liability and
damages under 18 U.S.C §§ 2333(a), 2339B, and 2339C).
73. Id. at 630.
74. See id. (reiterating that the bank was required to investigate their customers,
as well as any organization that transferred to or received funds from those
customers). The BSA, which was subsequently amended by the USA PATRIOT Act,
now requires banks to conduct rigorous “know your customer” customer
identification programs. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 5318(i), (l) (2006) (announcing
mandatory customer identification and due diligence requirements that oblige banks
to scrutinize account holders and report suspicious transactions).
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Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. If the statute were
enforced in such fashion, it would mean that ransom payments to
pirates by a U.S. shipping company, insurance company, or foreign
entity later found to be within the jurisdiction of the United States,
could be prosecuted under this provision even though the payments
76
are not made to any actual terrorists or terrorist organizations.
The legislative and case history demonstrates that the statute has
not yet been read in this manner, as the statute has only been used in
respect of funding activities involving known and designated terrorist
organizations. To date, § 2339C has never been used to prosecute
corporations or individuals who provided or collected funds to be
paid as ransom. The U.S. district courts—which would have
jurisdiction—have not utilized this statutory provision to prosecute
the payment of ransoms to pirate gangs. Moreover, there has been
no announcement by the Executive Branch that it would seek to
prosecute pirates as terrorists under the AEDPA. Although federal
authorities have restricted enforcement of § 2339C to cases involving
terrorist acts, if federal authorities decide to treat pirates as terrorists,
paying a ransom to pirates could readily be construed as a violation of
§ 2339C.
Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, with respect to a civil claim,
[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
77
including attorney’s fees.

The term “international terrorism” is explicitly defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1). That definition includes, inter alia, an element with
78
respect to the purpose of the prohibited activity. Accordingly, to be
“international terrorism” within the meaning of the statute, the
prohibited activity must “be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(A) (expressing in expansive terms the offense
prohibiting the financing of terrorism). The main purpose of the Convention is “to
ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts
against ships . . . includ[ing] the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against
persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely
to destroy or damage it.” INT’L MARITIME ORG., CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION, 1988, at 1,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(A).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
78. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1)(B)(i)–(iii) (requiring that before an activity may be
deemed international terrorism, it must appear to be aimed at intimidating a
population or government or affecting the conduct of a government).

RUTKOWSKI.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.THIRD (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

MUGGED TWICE?

6/22/2010 8:06 PM

1441

civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
79
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”
Thus, by its own terms, the statute does not apply to activity intended
solely for one’s private or personal pecuniary gain. In contrast,
private or personal gain is a required element to the crime of piracy
80
under the various U.S. federal antipiracy statutes.
The current interpretation of AEDPA militates against
prosecutions of companies for paying ransoms to Somali pirates. If
that interpretation were to change, foreign corporations may also
enjoy other jurisdictional protections. The question of whether
AEDPA applies to a foreign shipowner or insurance company will
hinge on whether there are sufficient contacts to find personal
jurisdiction.
In two recent AEDPA cases, courts reached different results on this
81
question. In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the Second
Circuit held that four Saudi Arabian princes and a Saudi banker, who
had each donated to a Muslim charity alleged to have funded the
terrorist organization al-Qaida, did not have sufficiently systematic
and continuous minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction
82
In Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian
under state and federal laws.
83
Authority, another case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2338, the
Palestinian Authority (“PA”) and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (“PLO”) were found to have sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a district court. The PLO maintained an office in
Washington, D.C. headed by the chief representatives of both groups,
employed nine staff members, and spent more than $200,000 in six
84
months on activities conducted in the United States. Additionally,
the court considered that the PLO maintained an Observer Mission
to the United Nations in New York that engaged in fundraising
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651–61 (outlining elements of piracy and forbidding,
generally, the plundering of money or property of any vessel belonging to another);
see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 (1820) (affirming the
piracy conviction of a seaman who mutinied with his crew and helped hijack another
vessel that was subsequently used to plunder a third ship at sea). Furthermore, it
should be noted that none of these federal antipiracy statutes make any mention of
the payment of ransoms.
81. 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (June 29, 2009).
82. Id. at 95–96 (holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that these
individuals had “‘expressly aimed’ intentional tortious acts at residents of the United
States”).
83. 153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001).
84. Id. at 88.
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activities and speaking engagements, the PA employed a lobbying
firm in the United States, and both groups maintained several bank
85
accounts in New York. Based on the holdings of these two cases, the
applicability of the statute to a foreign-based shipowner will depend
on its contacts in the United States, including those in connection
with the payment of the ransom.
F.

Federal Anti-Money Laundering Laws
86

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“MLCA”) is the
statute that formally defines money laundering as a federal crime.
The elements that constitute a violation of the MLCA are as follows:
(1) the defendant conducted a financial transaction; (2) the financial
transaction involved the use of “proceeds of specified unlawful
activity;” (3) the defendant knew the property involved in the
transaction were “proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;” and
(4) the defendant knew such transaction was “designed . . . to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
87
control of the proceeds.” A “specified unlawful activity” is defined
in § 1956(c) and includes such offenses as violence against maritime
navigation (18 U.S.C. § 2280), kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201), and
88
hostage taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203). The courts uniformly hold that
“proceeds” are “funds obtained from [some] prior, separate criminal
89
activity.”
The statute focuses on the source of the funds used rather than how
they are likely to be used. If ransom funds are to be derived from a
vessel owner’s own assets, insurance proceeds, or a loan from a
legitimate bank, then such ransom payment is almost certainly not
derived from one of the specified unlawful activities listed in §
1956(c). Consequently, it is doubtful that any federal prosecutor
could prove a violation of the second and third elements of the
MLCA, which require the funds to be known to be from a “specified
unlawful activity.” Moreover, the fourth element would be difficult to
prove because the purpose of any such ransom payment would not be
a financial transaction intended to conceal or disguise the source or
85. Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2006).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); see United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1526 (2d
Cir. 1997) (dissecting the elements of the MLCA, in regards to a narcotics trafficking
charge, to find the statute requires both that a defendant generally knew the
proceeds from the transaction were derived from criminal activity and that they were
to be used to cover up this activity).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
89. United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995), partially abrogated
on other grounds by United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2009).
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ownership of the proceeds. Given the court decisions cited above
and the text of the MLCA, it is evident that payment of a ransom to
the pirates would not in itself constitute a violation of the MLCA.
The scope of the MLCA has the jurisdictional hooks to apply
against a foreign company.
For purposes of adjudicating an action filed or enforcing a penalty
ordered under [18 U.S.C. § 1956], the district courts shall have
jurisdiction over any foreign person, including any financial
institution authorized under the laws of a foreign country, against
whom the action is brought, if service of process upon the foreign
person is made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
laws of the country in which the foreign person is found, and—(A)
the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a)
involving a financial transaction that occurs in whole or in part in
the United States; (B) the foreign person converts, to his or her
own use, property in which the United States has an ownership
interest by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a court of
the United States; or (C) the foreign person is a financial
institution that maintains a bank account at a financial institution
90
in the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1957 states that
[w]hoever, in any of the circumstances set forth [below], knowingly
engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is
derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) [of 18 U.S.C. § 1957] . . . . The
circumstances referred to . . . are—(1) that the offense under this
section takes place in the United States or in the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) that the
offense under [18 U.S.C. § 1957] takes place outside the United
States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United
91
States person . . . .

Therefore, the MLCA should not apply, under normal cases, to a
foreign shipowning company.
G. Bank Secrecy Act
The principal federal statute detailing the rights and obligations of
individuals, banks, and financial institutions in the United States to
assist U.S. government agencies in the detection and prevention of

90. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(a), (d).
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92

money laundering is the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”), which is
administered by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) at the Treasury Department. The BSA provides extensive
guidance for the filing of various required reports for certain kinds of
transactions. Since Congress passed the BSA, several other federal
93
statutes have been enacted to enhance and amend its provisions. A
review of the text of these statutes (contained in the FinCEN index)
reveals that their primary focus is on establishing the fundamental
requirements for record-keeping and reporting by private individuals,
banks, and financial institutions to aid the U.S. government in
identifying transfers of U.S. currency and money instruments into or
out of the United States.
The BSA requires that transfers of U.S. “monetary instruments” be
94
reported. The most pertinent section of the BSA imposes reporting
requirements on any “person or an agent or bailee of the person . . .
[who knowingly transfers] monetary instruments of more than
$10,000 at one time [] from a place in the United States to or
95
through a place outside the United States . . . .” Such reports are to
be filed at a time and place determined by the Secretary of the
96
Treasury. The statute further forbids failing—or causing another
97
person to fail—to file a report required under § 5316. Failure to
report such transfers may lead to civil or criminal forfeiture of the
98
property to the United States government.
The applicable regulations relating to the BSA (“BSA Regulations”)
are contained in 12 C.F.R § 21 and 31 C.F.R. § 103. The BSA
Regulations are intended to apply to banks, mutual funds, insurance
92. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114–24 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Titles 12, 15, and 31 of the United States Code).
93. See FinCEN, Bank Secrecy Act, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (detailing the range of money laundering provisions that
have been enacted to amend the BSA). FinCEN’s website provides a complete index
of all the federal anti-money laundering and financial reporting statutes passed since
1970. See id.
94. Within the BSA, “monetary instruments” means—
(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may prescribe by
regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer
negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock
on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and (C) as the
Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of [31
U.S.C.] sections 5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and
other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial
institution and are not in bearer form.
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3).
95. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A).
96. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(b).
97. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(1).
98. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(d).
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companies, stock and commodities brokers, and other financial
service providers so that such financial intermediaries do not hide the
99
transfer or deposit of money derived from criminal activity.
Additionally, the BSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder
apply for the most part only to domestic financial agencies and
100
domestic financial institutions that perform the reporting.
Thus,
these parts of the BSA Regulations should not apply to a shipowner
because the shipowner is not a financial agency or institution. While
one would need to closely inspect each provision separately, two of
the BSA Regulations merit further analysis.
BSA Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 103.16 requires an insurance company
within the United States involved as a business in the issuing or
101
underwriting of any “covered product” to file a Suspicious Activity
Report by Insurance Companies (“SAR-IC”) if an insurance payout
transaction is
conducted or attempted by, at, or through an insurance company,
and involves or aggregates at least $5,000 in funds or other assets,
and the insurance company knows, suspects, or has reason to
suspect that the transaction (or a pattern of transactions of which
the transaction is a part) . . . (iv) Involves use of the insurance
102
company to facilitate criminal activity.

Under a very broad reading of the word “facilitate,” a payment by a
U.S. underwriter to pirates may require the filing of SAR-IC by the
insurance company for the payout of an underwritten covered
product. However, FinCEN provided guidance in FIN-2008-G004,
issued on March 20, 2008, stating that a contract of indemnity would
103
FinCEN further stated that
not be considered a covered product.
such an insurance policy, which could provide kidnap and ransom
coverage, would otherwise not be considered a covered product—
even if a direct payout were made by the insurer—because the policy
lacks a cash value or an investment feature, which means that it poses
104
less risk of being utilized for money laundering.
99. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.15–103.22 (listing the suspicious transaction reporting
requirements for various financial institutions).
100. 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (b)(1).
101. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.16(a)(4) (defining a “covered product” as a permanent
life insurance policy, an annuity contract, or “other insurance product with features
of cash value or investment”).
102. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.16(b)(2), (2)(iv) (2009).
103. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GUIDANCE
FIN-2008-G004 3 (2008), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/fin2008-g004.pdf (clarifying that several products, including contracts of indemnity, are
not considered “covered products” because they are less likely to be used for money
laundering purposes).
104. As described by FinCEN:
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BSA Regulation 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 mandates that all individuals or
organizations make a report of the transportation of more than
$10,000 anytime they physically transport monetary instruments from
a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United
105
States.
That regulation states that “[a] person is deemed to have
caused such transportation . . . when he aids, abets, counsels,
commands, procures, or requests it to be done by a financial
106
institution or any other person.”
For this reason, a payer of a
ransom to pirates will clearly need to ensure that if U.S. currency is
transported from the United States to the designated payoff spot, a
report of the transfer is filed. If funds originating outside the United
States are used for ransom payments, federal anti-money-laundering
laws are generally not implicated.
CONCLUSION
If ransom payments were known to be made to terrorists or used to
fund terrorist activities, then such payments are likely to be illegal
and would likely be prosecuted. However, in early February, 2009,
Rear Admiral Ted Branch, Director of Information, Plans, and
Security at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, testified at a
Congressional hearing on piracy, stating that “agencies had been
looking for a link between terrorism and the piracy taking place off
107
the Somali Coast but had not detected any.”
This statement
supports the conclusion that the payment of ransom to pirates, who

The definition [of covered product] incorporates a functional approach,
and encompasses any insurance product having the same kinds of features
that make permanent life insurance and annuity products more at risk of
being used for money laundering, e.g., having a cash value or investment
feature. To the extent that . . . other kinds of insurance do not exhibit these
features, they are not products covered by the rule.
See id. at 3.
105. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a). Note, however, that the required reporting is subject
to several exceptions, which are set forth in § 103.23(c).
106. Id.
107. JORGE ROMERO ET AL., THE PIRATES OF PUNTLAND: PRACTICAL, LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY 6 (K&L Gates 2009). In contrast,
in March, 2009, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, reported:
[G]overnment officials in the northeastern Somali region of Puntland as well
as those in the ‘Transitional Federal Government’ [] of Somalia are
complicit in piracy and the fairly clear indications that al-Shabaab, an
al-Qaeda-linked Somali group that was formally designated a ‘foreign
terrorist organization’ last year by the U.S. Department of State, is getting at
least a part of the ransom proceeds in exchange for allowing the pirates to
operate in areas it controls . . . .
J. Peter Pham, Strategic Interests: Pondering Somali Piracy, WORLD DEF. REV., Apr. 23,
2009, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham042309.shtml.
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are not terrorists, is allowable in most circumstances under the laws
of the United States.
As discussed in the Introduction of this Article, however, following
the taking of the Maersk Alabama in the spring of 2009, officials in the
federal government, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
made comments about how Somali pirates could potentially be
108
treated as terrorists and made subject to monetary sanctions. This
call has since grown into rumors of possible legislative or regulatory
action to make ransom payments illegal, either specifically in Somalia
or as a more blanket policy. This speculation, if realized, would have
the unfortunate consequence of making the United States treat
ransom payments by a shipowner, manager, or insurance company
that is trying to save the lives of the ship operator’s crew as criminal
activity.
As of now, paying the ransoms is the only dependable way a
shipowner has to ensure the safe release of its crew. There is a fear
that the successes of piracy have helped fuel the practice. The
average ransom settlement has gradually increased over the past year,
and it is expected that the average ransom settlement may reach
109
$3,000,000 during 2010.
If ransom payments are made illegal, if pirates are deemed to be
terrorists, or if the number of persons blocked pursuant to the
Executive Order is expanded to include most known pirate
associates, shipowners will be placed in an untenable position: they
must either pay a ransom to ensure the safety of their crews and
consequently face a risk of prosecution for violating U.S. law, or
110
refuse payment and risk the lives of their crew. Fortunately, this is
108. See John Whitesides, Clinton Calls for Expanded Global Response to Piracy,
REUTERS, Apr. 15, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE53E5ZU20090415 (“[Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton] said the United States also would step up efforts to track and
freeze the monetary assets of the pirates, just as it does with drug traffickers and
terrorist groups.”).
109. See John Drake, Ships Face Greater Attack Risk in Indian Ocean, LLOYD’S LIST,
Feb. 19, 2010, at 13 (speculating that the average ransom payment could soon reach
three million dollars in light of the fact that the average payment not only reached a
record high in 2009 but has continued to swell since that time).
110. Other countries have already taken note of this problem. For example,
“H[ong] Kong shipowners have written to the Chinese government warning of the
possible consequences if the U.S. goes ahead with plans to make ransom payments to
pirates illegal.” See Wallis, supra note 47 (discussing the likelihood of a strong
backlash if the payment of ransoms are made illegal). The UK High Court of Justice
recently ruled that the payment of ransom for the safe release of vessel and crew
should not be categorized as contrary to public policy. See Masefield AG v. Amlin
Corporate Member Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Comm) 280, ¶ 95 [Eng.] (rejecting an
argument advanced by an insurer of cargo that was held for ransom that payment of
said ransom should be deemed to be against public policy).
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not the current state of affairs, but there is a possibility that the
current state of affairs may soon change from discouraging ransom
payments to prohibiting them. While payment of ransom may foster
piracy, criminalizing the victim cannot be the answer.
As the current state of affairs exists, there are limits to what a vessel
owner or its insurers might know about the identity of the pirates or
the intended purposes or final recipient of ransom proceeds. The
FCPA will generally not be implicated by the payment of ransom to
pirates, and so long as an entity does not know that the proceeds of
any ransom paid do not go directly to any person on the SDN List or
FTO List, it should avoid liability for violation of the OFAC
111
Regulations and the federal laws prohibiting support of terrorism.
Lastly, a U.S. entity should be aware that the payment of ransom is
not a violation of the federal anti-money-laundering statutes in and of
itself, but that the payment must comply with federal reporting
requirements with respect to the transfer of U.S. currency. If the
United States determines that pirates are terrorists, however, it has a
broad arsenal at its disposal to swiftly sanction those who pay ransoms
to pirates.

111. While some of the laws relating to the payment of ransom may be similarly
applicable to U.S. and non-U.S. entities, two of the more significant laws and
regulations, the OFAC Regulations and the MLCA, should not apply to a foreign
shipowning company without sufficient contacts to the United States.

